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SUGGESTIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
CORPORATIONS.
Having regard to their creation, there have been three princi-
pal eras of private corporations. During the first period they
were created by royal prerogative. These franchises were gener-
ally granted as royal favors. They were more or less related to
the administration of public affairs or the increase of the material
interests Qf the home government or its colonies. The purpose of
their creation was largely to extend the political power or increase
the revenues of the Crown. The essential characteristics of such
corporations were only two, perpetuity and exclusive rights. The
directors or managers constituted the corporation. Stockholders,
as the term is now used, were then unknown. Their existence
was not contemplated in the deed or grant of incorporation.
Their rights, duties and liabilities were not defined. They were
shareholders only in the limited sense that they had the right to
share the profits earned by the stockholders or managers. The
foundation of this right lay in contract only. Their relation to the
directors was that of trustee and cestui gui trust. As a general
rule they could not even select their own directors, the right to
fill vacancies in that body being vested in the remaining members
of- the board.
The second period is that in which, both in this country and in
England, corporations were created by legislative enactment.
Each corporation was created by a separate enactment. The
most general plan of creation was to constitute certain persons
named, as incorporators or commissioners, authorizing them to
receive subscriptions for the capital to be applied to the under-
taking named in the enactment. When a given amount of capital
was thus subscribed they were directed to call the subscribers
together, and the latter perfected their organization by electing
their officers and directors and defining their respective duties by
by-laws adopted by them. Thus the stockholders have come
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prominently into view. Their power in the organization and
management of the corporation is increased; that of the directors
is diminished and defined. The stockholders select the directors,
define their duties and limit the duration and scope of their
offices.
The public was not as yet quite prepared for the idea that he,
for whose benefit the common undertaking is carried on and who
derives all the resulting profits therefrom, should enjoy absolute
immunity from the common law liability of joint undertakers.
Therefore a conservative compromise between general, individual
liability on the one hand and entire immunity from the claims of
creditors on the other, was hit upon, and it was generally provided
that the individual liability of the stockholder for the debts of the
corporation should bear a limited, fixed relation to the amount of
stock held by him. This liability has been defined to be secon-
dary, the creditor being first required to pursue the corporation to
the extent of its assets. This idea is preserved in our national
bank statutes, whereby the stockholder is made individually
liable in an amount equal to the stock held by him. It is in most
of the charters of our State banks, and in some States, as in Ohio,
it applies to all private corporations. The prominent character-
istics of corporations of this era, as contrasted with the preceding
one are perpetuity, power of the stockholders over the manage-
ment of the company and limited liability of the stockholders.
As these corporations were created by an act of the legislative
body, politics often dominated its action both in granting and
withholding franchises. Strong lobbies grew up at our capitals,
whose business it was to procure valuable franchises and sell them
to others. The more liberal the scope of the charter, the greater
the immunity of the stockholder, the more valuable the franchise
was to sell. So broad and unlimited became the scope of these
franchises, that they were properly called "omnibus" charters.
One such might be instanced under which a steamship line was
operated on the Atlantic seaboard; it was next used as the con-
tractor to construct an interstate railway in the Southwest; now
it is used to supply a large city with gas. Naturally this nefari-
ous traffic in public franchises worked its own destruction; took
from our legislature the power to grant franchises, and produced
the third era of corporate creation which may be called the "Free
Corporation Era."
England has not entered into this era as completely as our
States have. There the right still resides in Parliament to create
certain corporations, such as railway companies. In all of the
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States of our Union and as to almost all kinds of corporations, the
right to become a corporation is free to any of its citizens, volun-
tarily aissociating themselves together for such purpose.
The evident purpose sought to be secured by these free corpo-
ration statutes, was to encourage opposition in manufacture and
commerce and to prevent monopoly. With few exceptions, there
is no liability on the part of the stockholders beyond paying for
the stock for which they have subscribed. This done, the com-
pany can borrow money, increase its liabilities to any extent it can
procure credit, run itself into hopeless bankruptcy, and the stock-
holders enjoy absolute immunity from the claims of creditors.
In many States there is absolutely nothing to prevent unlimited
"watering of capital stock." In a few States ten per centum of
the capital stock must be paid in cash. Even with this require-
ment, the organizers of the proposed corporation can subscribe
for one-tenth of the capital and pay that in full in cash, and there
their individual liability ceases. They can then issue to them-
selves the remaining nine-tenths of the capital stock "fully paid
up" in consideration for untried patent rights, or for other pro-
perty at enormously inflated value.
The capital stock being thus paid, may be then made the foun-
dation for further corporate dishonesty and false credit. Again
referring to the corporation statutes of our various States, we find
that in most of them, these corporations can issue bonds for an
amount equal to their paid-up capital stock. Thus a property,
which is not worth and would not sell for one thousand dollars, is
made the basis of ten thousand dollars of credit, simply because
certain incorporators are by law permitted to issue to themselves,
paid-up stock in excess of the true value of the property for which
the stock was issued. In addition to all this are the general liabil-
ities, the floating indebtedness of the company. If such a corpo-
ration be successful, the stockholder has realized on his watered
stock; if unsuccessful, the stockholder has lost only one-tenth of the
money invested-the creditor loses the balance. The latter then
has the lean choice of taking upon his shoulders an enterprise
which never should have been begun, or allowing it to go through
ruinous liquidation. The risk of the venture is almost entirely on
the creditor; the profit, if any, goes to the stockholder. This is
an extreme, but not an uncommon example. It simply carries out
the evil of our present corporate system to its ultimate results, and
illustrates its tendency. The large number of corporate stocks
now selling on our exchanges below par, prove to what extent they
do not represent actual value. lRecently, a judge of our federal-
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courts was called upon to appoint a receiver of a certain railroad.
A newspaper article, announcing this fact the next morning, stated
that it had been expected that the road would be open for traffic
within a month, but the appointment of a receiver may delay this.
Poor thing, it had died at its birth. Most probably its parents
did not lose much; the creditors had built it.
Looking at the present condition of the markets for our cor-
porate securities, we may see that the striking characteristics of
the corporations of our third era are protection to the stockholder,
risk to the creditor. The reason for this is not hard to find when
we consider the manner in which many of our corporate enter-
prises have been organized.
But how remedy this? The national bank system of govern-
mental inspection and valuation of assets and compulsory liquida-
tion or repairment of capital by assessment upon stockholders, in
case of impairment of capital, will perhaps be thought too inquis-
itorial and paternal for these times. We would therefore suggest
the following, not so drastic, but largely efficacious.
First, Permit capital stock to be issued only for cash, and only
to the amount of cash actually paid by the stockholders. Thus,
capital stock will mean what it pretends to be, so much money in-
vested in the corporate enterprise.
Second, Make the stockholder individually liable to creditors for
the amount, at least, equal to the stock held by him. As stated
above, courts have construed this liability to be secondary to the
primary liability of the corporation itself.
Third, Prohibit the directors from issuing bonds, debentures or
other fixed forms of indebtedness, without the consent of the
majority of the stockholders. If stockholders are individually
liable, even to a limited extent, they will not lightly consent to the
company's borrowing money it cannot reasonably expect to pay,
nor will they long suffer with a directory whose management is
running the company into bankruptcy, and them into individual
liability.
Reorganization plans, reorganization committees of bankrupt
companies are heard of on every hand. The plan invariably is to
cut down the capital stock to something like its real value, or
assess the stockholders, to give the stock an intrinsic value. Why
not do this when the corporation is organized, and give to corpor-
ate stocks and bonds a just and honest basis of value? The times'
demand a remedy. Our legislators should provide, one.
Willis F. AfcCook.
PITTSBURGH, PA.
